Cement, Energy and Environment

Looking to the reluctance of developed countries, in general, to step up their efforts to reduce emissions and in contributing generously to the Green Climate Fund, world leaders have started expressing their reservations over the outcome of the Paris summit. The feeling is gaining ground that, for the present, it is better to have an acceptable deal and make upward corrections by way of intensified efforts through periodic reviews of country pledges with the first review taking place in 2025. There's also the question of what the US wants the compact to be. The working group's position It may be recalled that in Durban (2011 ), there was much debate on the nature of the new compact; finally there was agreement that it could be a " legal instrument" or "an agreed outcome with legal force". Whether all the provisions of the deal will have legal force or only some of them was the subject of much debate at the recent meeting of the ad hoc working group on long-term action under the Durban Platform held in Bonn ( August 31-September 4). The consensus was that, to start with, INDCs could be divided into three parts: one with a legally binding force, another without and a third which could be fitted into one of the two later. Differences surfaced over identification of the issues for such compartmentalisation. For instance, some of the bigger emitters like the US baulked at the suggestion of keeping pledges of emission cuts or contributions to the Green Climate Fund in the part having legal force. Developing countries, particularly the poorer ones, insisted on such inclusion as their efforts towards mitigation and adaptation depended largely on financial assistance technology flowing and transfer from the developed countries. Reacting to the situation, the British Prime Minister almost backtracked on the Durban decision and expressed his preference for a "light touch and non- legislative approach" that struck a sympathetic chord in other leaders of the developed world . A legally binding deal with a "light touch" or preferably a fully non-legal one is what the US needs for a weighty reason . Joining any treaty that may have significant implications for the US economy needs the approval of the US Senate. Most of the Republican senators are either climate sceptics or non-believers that global warming is predominantly manmade. Therefore any proposal to become a party to a treaty that may have more than a mild impact on the US economy is unlikely to meet with success. A simple, not too legalistic agreement in Paris, may enable President Obama to bypass the Senate and ratify the agreement by exercising his executive powers. If questioned, he can convince the Senate of the deal being just a simple addendum to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of which the US is already a party or that its provisions are covered by existing US laws and hence need no fresh clearance. Further, US reservations on a legally binding deal rests on its apprehension that the deal may end up prescribing limits on a country's emissions just as the Kyoto Protocol did earlier and this may mean immediate curbs on US fossil fuel production. The US approach to fighting coal and oi l addiction is not to attack the supply side of the problem but its demand side. Obama believes that increasing the availability of renewable energy at prices comparable to that of conventional energy is a better way of promoting the former than taking the politically inadvisable step of curbing coal and oil production drastically. A strong climate treaty that may imply such cutbacks would be 10 •· }